Facilities that self-police under the Environmental Protection Agency's Audit Policy are eligible for reduced penalties on disclosed violations. This paper investigates whether self-policing has additional consequences, in particular whether self-policing reduces future enforcement activity. Using data on U.S. hazardous waste enforcement and disclosures, I find that facilities that selfpolice are rewarded with a lower probability of inspection in the future, although facilities with good compliance records receive a smaller benefit than facilities with poor records. Additionally, facilities that are inspected frequently are more likely to disclose than facilities that face a low probability of inspection. The results suggest that facilities may be able to strategically disclose in order to decrease future enforcement.
Introduction
In 1995 the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued the Audit Policy, a policy designed to encourage greater compliance with environmental regulations by providing incentives for regulated facilities to conduct environmental audits and voluntarily disclose any violations that they discover.
1 Under the Audit Policy facilities that self-police -that is, voluntarily disclose a violation to regulators -are eligible for significant penalty reductions.
EPA's website for environmental auditing also notes that when facilities self-police, it can render "formal EPA investigations and enforcement actions unnecessary." 2 This statement implies that as well as rewarding self-policers with reduced penalties, EPA's Audit Policy may provide additional incentives in the form of reduced future enforcement.
Although the Audit Policy has been in effect for about a decade, there has been relatively little analysis of its implementation or effect on regulated entities. EPA provides anecdotal evidence of the Audit Policy's use as well as statistics on self-disclosures made under the policy, but its only formal evaluation is a 1999 voluntary survey of a small number of companies that disclosed environmental violations under the policy. 3 While the respondents to the survey generally indicated a favorable experience with the policy, there was no analysis of the factors that induced facilities self-police. In a non-EPA study, Pfaff and Sanchirico (2004) violated, types of violations, and average fines. They find that the typical disclosed violation is relatively minor: in particular, reporting and recordkeeping violations constitute over 90 percent of disclosed violations. While there is no formal analysis of the factors that drive facilities to self-police, the authors provide a number of potential explanations for their finding that selfdisclosed violations are very different in nature from detected violations including the structure of the Audit Policy's incentives and the cost of auditing. 4 Pfaff and Sanchirico also speculate that facilities could be using the disclosure of minor violations as "red herrings" to discourage future inspections or distract regulators from other problems.
Although EPA implies that self-policing may have future consequences and Pfaff and
Sanchirico suggest that facilities might be strategically disclosing violations to affect future enforcement, to date no study has examined whether facilities that self-police actually do receive differential treatment in the future. It is important to understand what the future consequences of self-policing are to be able to fully evaluate EPA's Audit Policy. This paper uses data on selfdisclosures and enforcement activity at regulated hazardous waste facilities to examine whether disclosures do affect future enforcement activity. In addition, the analysis provides insight into other factors that motivate self-policing. A more complete understanding of the factors that drive facilities to self-police will also help to assess the effectiveness of the current policy and potentially can be used to fine-tune the program to increase its effectiveness. While the results of the analysis are obviously most relevant for EPA's Audit Policy, they will also provide important lessons on the use of self-policing as regulatory tool in other policy arenas.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes EPA's selfpolicing policy in more detail; Section 3 provides a theoretical framework for considering the self-policing decision; Section 4 outlines the empirical approach for the analysis and describes the data; Section 5 presents the results of the analysis; Section 6 discusses the implications of the analysis for EPA's Audit Policy and, more generally, for self-policing as a regulatory tool; and Section 7 concludes.
EPA's Self-Policing Policy
Starting in the 1980's EPA began encouraging facilities to voluntarily undertake environmental audits. In 1986, EPA issued an Environmental Auditing Policy Statement which recommended the use of environmental auditing and encouraged states and local governments to develop environmental auditing initiatives. In December of 1995 EPA issued "Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations," which both revised the 1986 policy statement and provided incentives for facilities to voluntarily disclose and correct violations of environmental regulations. The provision of explicit incentives for selfpolicing extended the revised policy well beyond environmental auditing. However, because it evolved from EPA's initial policy on environmental auditing, the revised policy is commonly referred to as the Audit Policy. In fact, facilities do not have to conduct environmental audits to benefit from the incentives contained in this policy. Any facility that voluntarily identifies, discloses, and corrects violations of environmental regulations is eligible for a reduction in the penalties associated with those violations. Additionally, as long as no actual harm has occurred, EPA will not recommend criminal prosecution for facilities "acting in good faith to identify, disclose, and correct violations."
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To be eligible for a complete waiver of punitive penalties the self-disclosure must meet all of the following nine conditions:
1. Systematic discovery: discovery must either take place during an environmental audit or during a self-evaluation that is part of a due diligence program.
2. Voluntary discovery: the process though which the violation is discovered cannot be required by federal, state or local authorities and cannot be required by statute, regulation, permit or consent agreement.
3. Prompt disclosure: violations must be disclosed within 21 days of discovery. 4. Independent discovery and disclosure: the disclosure cannot be made after an inspection or investigation has been announced or notice of a suit has been given.
5. Correction and remediation: any harm from the violation must be remediated and the violation must be corrected within 60 days of the date of discovery unless technological issues are a factor.
6. No recurrence: the facility must identify why the violation occurred and take steps to ensure that it won't recur.
7. No repeat violations: the same or a closely related violation can't have occurred within the past three years at the facility or within the past five years at other facilities owned by the same parent organization.
5 60 FR 16876. 6 The initial disclosure period was 10 days, but the time frame was increased to 21 days in (65 FR 19618, April 11, 2000 . If the disclosure meets conditions two through nine but does not meet the first condition for systematic discovery, it is eligible for only 75 percent mitigation of the punitive penalties rather than complete mitigation.
Importantly, the Audit Policy does not apply to the portion of the penalty that is based on the economic benefit gained from noncompliance. For example, if a facility neglects to sample a particular wastestream for several months and discovers this violation through an environmental audit, assuming the violation meet all of the conditions above, the facility would receive a complete reduction in the punitive portion of the penalty but would continue to owe a penalty equal to the savings it received from not having conducted those samples. This requirement is necessary to ensure that regulated entities have no incentive to deliberately violate and then selfpolice. In the example above, there would be no benefit to deliberately not sampling and then self-policing if the regulated entity has to pay the cost of sampling after disclosure.
During the development of the Audit Policy, EPA repeatedly sought comments from the regulated community. One commenter on an early version of the policy suggested that EPA should commit to taking audits into account when assessing enforcement actions. In response, EPA stated that agreeing to forgo inspections or reduce enforcement responses is "fraught with legal and policy obstacles". 7 However EPA also noted that, since effective audit programs should improve compliance, facilities that audit should have improved environmental performance which is likely to be considered in setting inspection priorities. Such language is consistent with EPA's current statements that self-policing can make formal inspections less necessary.
Theoretical Framework
A number of theoretical papers have examined the concept of voluntary self-policing in a static model. 8 For example, Kaplow and Shavell (1994) model a probabilistic enforcement regime and show that if regulated facilities that self-police face a reduced fine equal to the certainty equivalent of the sanction they would receive if they did not disclose but instead took their chances that the violation would be discovered, self-policing will not affect deterrence.
Facilities for which the reduced fine is less than the cost of compliance will violate and selfpolice, while facilities for whom the reduced fine is greater than the cost of compliance will comply. Additionally, such a regime will result in a welfare improvement because enforcement effort is reduced as self-policers need not be inspected. Innes (1999) extends this model by considering the potential benefits of remediation under a self-policing policy. As in the Kaplow and Shavell model, facilities will self-police and remediate as long as the total cost of selfpolicing (any fines plus the cost of remediation) is less than or equal to the expected cost of detection. With self-policing remediation will increase because self-policers remediate with certainty while non-disclosers only remediate when caught. However, Innes also shows that 8 The term self-policing is used in this paper to denote a situation in which a facility voluntarily notifies authorities that it has violated a regulation. Other authors such as Kaplow and Shavell (1994) have termed this same activity "self-reporting." However, the term self-reporting has also been used to describe situations where facilities are required by law to report information to regulators (such as the self-reported emissions data required for the Toxics Release Inventory).
self-policing may result in a reduction in the initial level of care taken to prevent environmental harm. 9 In a separate paper, Innes (2001) shows that if violators can engage in avoidance activities, self-policing can increase efficiency by reducing such activities and, in turn, allowing the government to achieve the same level of deterrence with a reduced enforcement effort. shows that facilities will only audit if they intend to remediate the violation, although not all facilities will disclose their remediated violations. Friesen also shows that the regulators will not inspect a facility that has disclosed a violation.
In all of the environmental self-policing models, a facility's decision to self-police depends on the cost of disclosure relative to the likelihood of detection and the cost of 9 For example, if environmental damages increase over time, it may be optimal to induce additional self-policing (and thus early remediation) by setting the cost of self-policing below the expected cost of detection. However, lowering the cost of self-policing decreases the level of deterrence and thus can result in a decrease in the initial level of care. 10 Since avoidance activities are reduced, the cost of increasing penalty levels is reduced and the government can substitute higher penalties for lower enforcement effort.
detection. 11 Obviously, the models vary significantly in the factors that affect the cost of disclosure (e.g., whether a compliance audit or remediation is required), the likelihood of detection (e.g., whether facilities face different probabilities of detection or whether audits increase the likelihood of detection) and the cost of detection (e.g. whether remediation costs increase over time). However, none of the existing self-policing models allow regulated facilities and regulators to repeatedly interact or allow for optimal actions take future consequences into account. 12 In a repeated setting, regulators could use decreased future enforcement as an added inducement for self-policing. Thus, when deciding whether or not to self-police, facilities would compare the cost of disclosure to the likelihood of detection, the cost of detection, and any future changes in enforcement. Since EPA's website implies that selfpolicing can affect future enforcement activity, I develop a dynamic model of self-policing to provide a theoretical framework for this empirical analysis.
Although there are no self-policing models that incorporate a dynamic enforcement regime, a number of papers have considered dynamic enforcement of regulations more generally.
Two of the most influential models are Harrington's (1988) targeted enforcement model and Scholz's (1984) cooperative regulatory enforcement model. Harrington's targeted enforcement model uses changes in future inspection activity to motivate current compliance and shows that such a regime can maintain a higher level of compliance than can be obtained through more 11 In addition to the models discussed above, there several other papers that address environmental self-policing including Heyes (1996) , Innes (2000) , Kesan (2000) and Pfaff and Sanchirico (2000) . 12 Friesen's (2006) model is sequential (i.e., regulators can incorporate self-policing into their enforcement strategy) but it is not dynamic. Livernois and McKenna (1999) and Hentschel and Randall (2000) both present dynamic self-reporting models. In these two models, self-reporting is mandatory, and thus facilities must decide whether to comply as well as whether to truthfully report their compliance status while regulators use fines and inspection probabilities to both maximize compliance and induce truthful reporting.
traditional, non-targeted enforcement. 13 Scholz's model of cooperative regulatory enforcement also uses future consequences to encourage compliance and shows that such a strategy can be more beneficial than a strict deterrence approach. However, in Scholz's model regulators use differences in sanctions (i.e., harsh sanctions versus a more cooperative approach) rather than differences in inspections as both a punishment and a reward. Given Harrington's focus on changes in the probability of enforcement it was chosen as the starting point for the dynamic self-policing model. In Harrington's targeted enforcement model, regulators classify all regulated facilities into one of two groups: G 1 is the "good" group and G 2 is the targeted or "bad" group. Inspection probabilities vary across the groups with the inspection probability for G 1 less than the inspection probability for G 2 . 14 Facilities found in violation of regulations are always moved into the target group while facilities found to be in compliance can transition to the non-target group with some positive probability. Each period, facilities choose whether or not to comply. The regulator then inspects the facility with a probability based on the facility's group and facilities are moved from one group to the other if warranted. Facilities that are not inspected stay in their group for the next period. This targeted enforcement regime can lead to higher levels of compliance than would occur under a regime where all facilities face the same probability of inspection.
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13 While Harrington was not the first to introduce targeted or state-dependent enforcement (see, for example, Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) ), he was the first to develop a model of targeted enforcement in an environmental context. 14 Fines for discovered violations also vary across the two groups. 15 There have been a number of extensions to Harrington's basic model (see for example, Harford and Harrington (1991) and Friesen (2003) ). However, none of them have incorporated self-policing.
Additionally, anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that the targeted enforcement model is consistent with current EPA enforcement practices.
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Using Harrington's model as a starting point, I develop a model of self-policing in a targeted enforcement regime (hereafter referred to as the SEPTER model). The remainder of this section provides an overview of the model, focusing on its predictions for facility and regulator behavior. A companion paper, Stafford (2006) , presents the SEPTER model in more detail. As in Harrington, facilities start in one of two groups based on past compliance behavior.
Inspection probabilities vary across the groups with the inspection probability for G 1 () less than the inspection probability for G 2 (). Facilities found in violation of regulations are always moved into the target group while facilities found to be in compliance can transition to the nontarget group with some positive probability. Additionally, in the SEPTER model facilities that self-police can be rewarded with some positive probability of transitioning to the non-target group.
There are two possible types of noncompliance, deliberate and inadvertent. 17 By including both deliberate and inadvertent compliance, the SEPTER model captures the fact that self-policing is not possible for all violations. 18 Facilities are required to abate pollution at a cost of c per period. If a facility does not abate and is inspected, the deliberate violation will be discovered and the facility will be fined Z. Facilities are also subject to probabilistic spills that occur with probability p and will inadvertently render the facility noncompliant. To discover 16 For example, the introduction to EPA's Fiscal Year 2002 Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Report states that EPA uses "data analysis and other relevant information to marshal and leverage resources to target significant noncompliance," (U.S. EPA 2003, page 3). Helland (1998) examines enforcement of the Clean Water Act using data on the pulp and paper industry and finds that regulator behavior is generally consistent with a targeted enforcement model. 17 Harrington (1988) assumes only deliberate compliance. 18 As noted in Section 2, some violations are expressly excluded from the Audit Policy.
whether a spill has occurred, facilities must conduct an audit at a cost of a. Returning to compliance costs k, but once remediated the spill cannot be detected by regulators. If the spill occurs and a facility does not remediate but is inspected, it is assessed a fine F which includes the cost of remediation as well as a punitive fine. Alternatively, if the facility discovers the occurrence, remediates, and discloses it to regulators, the facility receives a fine R. Since R does not include the cost of remediation, R + k must be less than F. To be consistent with EPA's Audit policy, facilities must make the disclosure decision prior to an inspection occurring.
Finally, note that facilities cannot disclose deliberate violations to receive a reduced fine.
Each period regulators receive one of four possible signals about the facility's compliance status:
i. Compliance: the facility is inspected and there is no detected violation;
ii. Violation: the facility is inspected and a violation (deliberate and/or inadvertent) is detected;
iii. Disclosure: the facility discloses an inadvertent violation and there is no deliberate violation (either because the facility abated or because there is no inspection); or iv. No information: the facility does not disclose and there is no inspection.
As shown in the transition matrix presented in Table 1 , with no new information the facility's group does not change. Facilities in G 2 that are found in compliance will move to G 1 with probability g. Facilities found to be in violation will be in G 2 next period, regardless of their starting point. Finally, facilities that disclose but have not been found to be in violation through an inspection will stay in G 1 if they begin in G 1 and will move to G 1 with probability q if they begin in G 2 . Assuming that inspection probabilities and fines are constant, as long as future payoffs are discounted by  where 0   < 1, the optimal facility policy is a stationary policy that will be independent of the initial state of the system.
With respect to deliberate violations, the facility has two possible choices, to abate or to pollute. With respect to the probabilistic violations, the facility must make three decisions: (1) whether to audit; (2) whether to remediate a violation is one if discovered; and (3) whether to disclose a violation. If a facility decides not to audit, it has no more decisions to make. If it does audit, it can choose to remediate but conceal the violation, remediate and disclose the violation, or to not remediate and not disclose. This is consistent with EPA's Audit Policy, as remediation is required as a part of disclosure. However, auditing without remediating or disclosing is Given these strategies, one can write down the expected cost of each strategy based on whether the facility is in G 1 or G 2 . The facility then has 36 possible policies denoted by f ij where i describes the strategy taken in G 1 and j describes the strategy taken in G 2 . To evaluate the expected cost of each policy, one solves the system of equations formed by taking (1) the expected cost of strategy i using G 1 as a starting point and (2) the expected cost of strategy j using G 2 as a starting point. Some of the expected cost functions are very straightforward. For example, a facility that chooses a policy of abatement and disclosure in both groups (f 55 ) is always in full compliance and has an expected present value cost of
However, other policies have much more complicated expected costs as the regulated facility will move in and out of the two groups based on inspections and disclosures.
Given the regulator's targeting plan and the facility's costs, the goal of the facility is to choose the policy that minimizes the present value of expected costs. Which policy will ultimately be most profitable depends on the relative costs of abatement and auditing as shown in Table 2 . 19 As long as audit costs are low, facilities will always audit. However, whether they will abate or disclose depends on abatement costs and fines for disclosed violations. As long as abatement costs are low, facilities will always abate but whether they will audit and disclose depends on the relative costs of auditing and the fines for disclosed violations. When both audit and abatement costs are low, facilities will always audit and abate, but will not disclose because facilities do not care about the probability of inspection. When neither audit or abatement costs are low, the optimal strategy is more difficult to determine and depends not only on the relative costs of auditing and abatement, but also on the rates at which facilities are moved between the two groups and the fines imposed for disclosed violations.
Regulators can affect a facility's optimal strategy by manipulating the self-policing policy parameters (that is, the setting of R and q) as well as other enforcement parameters such as the inspection rate and the fines for violations. For example, decreasing the fine for disclosed violations (R) or increasing the probability that a facility that discloses in the target group will be moved to the non-target group (q) will increase both audits and disclosures at facilities in the target group, although such changes will not affect auditing or disclosure in the non-target group. 20 However, such actions are likely to result in decreased abatement overall, as disclosure will become a more cost effective method of decreasing future enforcement relative to abatement. This effect is consistent with Pfaff and Sanchirico's (2004) proposition that facilities might use the disclosure of minor violations as "red herrings" to discourage inspections or distract regulators from other problems. In fact, as discussed in more detail in Stafford (2006) , any changes to the self-policing or enforcement policy parameters will involve tradeoffs between increased auditing and disclosures and increased abatement.
Given the tradeoffs between auditing, disclosures and abatement, it is not possible to explicitly solve for the optimal self-policing policy without specifying both the joint distribution of abatement and audit costs as well as the relative benefit from auditing (i.e., remediation of probabilistic violations), disclosure, and abatement. Such data do not currently exist and would be very difficult to obtain. However, we can determine empirically whether the SEPTER model provides an appropriate description of regulator and facility behavior. There is already some existing anecdotal and empirical evidence suggesting that EPA uses targeted enforcement, so we should find that compliance histories affects inspection probability even if SEPTER is not an appropriate model of EPA's self-policing policy. Additionally, all self-policing models imply that facilities with a high probability of enforcement are more likely to disclose than facilities with a low probability of enforcement, ceteris paribus. However, only the SEPTER model implies that disclosures in the recent past should decrease the probability of future inspections and that the effect of disclosures on future inspections should depend on the facility's compliance history (i.e., whether or not they are in a target group).
Empirical Approach
Because federal environmental regulations are media-specific, there are separate programs that regulate air, water, toxic materials, and hazardous waste. Although facilities may be regulated under more than one program, each program conducts its own enforcement actions. This model can be estimated using maximum likelihood, although the effect of disclosures on the inspection decision is only identified subject to either an exclusion or a covariance restriction. For an exclusion restriction to be valid, the variable excluded from X i should be theoretically as well as statistically related to the facility's benefit from disclosure but unrelated to the regulator's benefit from inspection. This analysis exlcudes the variable State Audit Immunity from the Inspection equation to identify the model. State Audit Immunity is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the state in which the facility is located has a law providing immunity from civil penalties to facilities that self-disclose. State immunity laws decrease the cost of disclosure for a facility because they limit the penalty that can be assessed for disclosed violations. However this immunity does not apply to violations that are discovered during the course of a regulator's inspection and therefore should not affect the incentives of a regulator to inspect a facility. Thus in theory State Audit Immunity should affect the disclosure decision but not the inspection decision. Moreover, State Audit Immunity does not have a significant effect if it is included in a standard probit regression of the Inspection equation that excludes the disclosure variables, so it is not statistically related to the likelihood of an inspection. However, as discussed in more detail in the Results section, it does have a significant effect on the likelihood that a facility discloses. Helland (1998) would allow for the estimation of the violation equation in addition to the inspection and disclosure equations. However, the DCE model does not allow for correlated errors, and the results of our bivariate probit model indicate that, at a minimum, the errors in the Inspection and Disclosure equations are correlated. Moreover, the DCE is not designed to control for endogenous explanatory variables. 26 The omitted category is non-generators, that is facilities that do not generate hazardous waste themselves. Non-generators could include transporters, transfer facilities, and some types of hazardous waste management facilities. While a facility may only fall into one of the three possible generator categories, a regulated facility can concurrently be a generator, treatment facility, and a transporter.
quantity of hazardous waste generated by a facility should be highly correlated with the potential for environmental damages at a site, in the Inspection equation I expect the coefficients on these variables to be positive. Additionally, the more waste on site, the higher the probability of a spill or violation and thus I expect positive coefficients in the Disclosure equation as well. Similarly, since facilities that treat, store, or dispose hazardous waste (Treatment, Storage, or Disposal Facility) have a higher potential for environmental releases than facilities that only generate waste but do not manage it on site, I expect a positive coefficient in the Inspection equation.
Because such facilities are also subject to additional regulations, I anticipate that they are more likely to be in violation and thus more likely to disclose as well.
Transporters are facilities that transport hazardous waste. Given that the paperwork Although I could not directly include state dummies in the analysis as there are so few facilities that disclose in any given state, I do include a number of variables in the analysis to control for state differences in enforcement programs as well as dummies for the different EPA regions.
Other research has shown that states with self-policing policies (State Self-Policing Policy) or audit privilege (State Audit Privilege) may use such policies as substitutes for more traditional enforcement, so I expect a negative sign on these two variables in the Inspection equation.
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27 In theory, one benefit of such policies is that enforcement resources can be reduced with no effect on deterrence, and thus I would expect them to have a negative effect on the likelihood of inspection. See, for example, Kaplow and Shavell (1994) and Innes (1999) . Additionally, Stafford (2005) higher the number of state inspections, the more likely it is that any one facility will be inspected. The higher the inspection intensity, the more likely it is that a state conducts multiple inspections as a single facility, and thus the lower the probability of inspection at any given facility. Since the higher the probability of an inspection, the higher the benefit from disclosure, Similarly the effect on disclosures is not obvious. Finally, I include dummies for nine of EPA's ten regions to control for regional differences in enforcement policies although I have no prior expectations as to the effect of these dummies on the likelihood of inspections or disclosures.
Results
The primary objective of this analysis is to determine whether voluntary disclosures under EPA's self-policing policy are rewarded with a decrease in future enforcement. The results of the bivariate probit regression, presented in Table Table 5 , the representative facility has an initial inspection probability of 1.87 percent.
If this facility discloses a violation it will be rewarded with a 1.83 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of inspection. Thus after disclosure, the probability of inspection would be 0.04 percent. If a facility's characteristics are not the same as those of the representative facility, both the initial inspection probability and the size of the effect of a disclosure will change. However, on average a disclosure in 2001 reduces the probability of inspection in 2002 by four-fifths. 29 It is also interesting to note that for the representative facility the reward for a disclosure is of similar magnitude as the punishment the facility would receive for a violation (an increase of 2.39 percentage points if the facility is newly caught or an increase of 1.02 percentage points if the facility has violated previously). Thus disclosures can significantly mitigate the consequences of a bad inspection (i.e., one where violations are discovered).
The SEPTER model implies that a disclosure will decrease the likelihood of an inspection for facilities in the target group, but will not change the likelihood of inspection for facilities in the non-target group. To determine whether the reward to disclosure differs for facilities with good and bad compliance records, I ran the bivariate probit regression on two separate subgroups, those facilities with no detected violations from 1997 to 2001 and those facilities with a least one detected violation during that period. 30 Table 6 presents the estimated effect of a disclosure on the probability of inspection for these two subgroups. 31 Since facilities with good compliance records represent approximately 95 percent of the total population of RCRA-regulated facilities, it is not surprising that the results for facilities with good compliance records are quite similar to the results for all facilities. However, for facilities with poor compliance records, that is facilities with at least one violation from 1997 to 2001, the probability of inspection is significantly higher at the representative facility, as is the probability of a disclosure. As implied by the SEPTER model, the reward to disclosure is also much larger for facilities with poor compliance records. In fact, although the representative "poor" facility is almost ten times more likely to be inspected than the representative "good" facility in the absence of a disclosure, the estimated probability of inspection is approximately the same for a good facility that has disclosed and a poor facility that has disclosed. Thus the assumption that regulators reward disclosures by moving facilities out of the target group is consistent with 30 Because Disclosed in 2001 is an endogenous variable, it is not possible to simply interact Disclosed in 2001 with the Good Compliance Record variable. 31 Complete results of the bivariate probit regression for these two subgroups are available from the author upon request.
evidence. However, although facilities with good compliance records that disclose get a smaller benefit from disclosure than facilities with poor records, even facilities with good records receive a positive reward from disclosure. While the SEPTER model implies that facilities in the nontarget group should not be rewarded by disclosure, this is due to the assumption that there are only two groups of facilities. If instead there is a continuum of inspection probabilities rather than just two groups, one would expect disclosures to be rewarded for all facilities.
Although the focus of this analysis is on self-policing and disclosures, it should be noted that the other coefficients in the Inspection equation are generally consistent with the expectations discussed in Section 4 and provide additional evidence of a targeted enforcement regime. However, there are a couple of interesting results that warrant discussion. First, given that EPA cannot inspect every facility each year I expected the coefficient on Inspected in 2001 to be negative, although it is positive and significant. This suggests that in addition to compliance history and the other factors measured in this analysis, there are unobserved or omitted characteristics that the enforcement agency is targeting such as specific activities or substances at the facility that make the facility more likely to be inspected. Second, the coefficient on Ignored is also positive and significant, the opposite of our expectation. Thus facilities are not ignored by regulators forever; rather there is a higher probability of being inspected, ceteris paribus, if the facility has been ignored in the past. This suggests that inspections in a given year may not be random, that is regulators may have some underlying schedule that they use to determine where to employ enforcement resources and that time since last inspection may be an important determinant of a facility's likelihood of inspection. If this is true, models that assume probabilistic inspection such as the model presented in Section 3 are missing an important feature of the enforcement system.
Next consider the Disclosure equation. As discussed in Section 4, in interpreting these results one must remember this is a reduced form model and does not consider the underlying violation process. However, the findings do provide useful insights into the factors that affect disclosures under EPA's Audit Policy. According to the SEPTER model, facilities in the target group should be more likely to disclose than facilities that are not in the target group. Assuming that the variable Ignored provides a rough proxy for membership in the non-target group, the results show that non-target facilities are significantly less likely to disclose than facilities that are not ignored. The positive and significant coefficient on Five Year Inspection History is also consistent with expectations that facilities that face a higher probability of inspection are more likely to disclose. Also as expected, Large Quantity Generators, Small Quantity Generators and facilities that are subject to regulation under other media programs (i.e., Other Permit) are more likely to disclose. However, the negative and significant coefficient on Treatment, Storage, and Disposal facility is not consistent with the expectation that such facilities are subject to more regulation and thus more likely to violate and to disclose. It could be that since treatment, storage, and disposal facilities are both highly regulated and heavily inspected, these facilities are less likely to discover inadvertent violations, that is, the types of violations for which the Audit Immunity. These programs were all adopted specifically to increase audits and disclosures.
While the results show that state self-policing policies and audit immunity legislation are effective at increasing disclosures, the insignificant coefficient on State Audit Privilege suggests that such legislation does not increase disclosures. The most likely explanation for this result is that privilege alone does not provide direct incentives to facilities to disclose, although it does decrease the potential risks from auditing.
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Finally, as shown in Table 5 a large quantity generator is over three times more likely to be inspected than the representative facility and seven times more likely to disclose. Therefore, as a robustness check Table 7 
Implications for EPA's Audit Policy and Self-Policing in General
Given the empirical evidence presented above, the SEPTER model appears to provide a reasonable description of self-policing under EPA's Audit Policy. It is important to note that in the SEPTER model, facilities may increase the level of auditing and abatement without making disclosures, so that one cannot evaluate the effectiveness of a self-policing policy by looking at disclosures alone. Another key feature of the SEPTER model is that facilities may make tradeoffs between self-policing and other forms of regulatory compliance. For example, facilities may strategically disclose violations in order to decrease future enforcement and then take advantage of the "enforcement holiday" to commit more significant violations of environmental regulations. The results of this empirical analysis show that the decrease in future enforcement is quite dramatic and thus the possibility for using disclosures as "red herrings" is very real.
In light of the low level of participation of hazardous waste facilities in EPA's selfpolicing policy, one might ask whether the potential for strategic disclosure really poses a significant concern. As shown in Table 3 , only 5 of every 10,000 RCRA-regulated facilities disclosed a violation in 2001, compared to 1 in 100 facilities that had a violation detected by regulators. While self-policing is slightly more common in the entire regulated community -in
2001, approximately 1 of every 1,000 regulated facilities disclosed a violation -it is still not a frequent annual occurrence. 33 Given current participation levels, unless the consequences from self-disclosure persist for a very long time the percentage of facilities on "enforcement holidays"
will be insignificant relative to the large percentage of facilities that are already "ignored" by regulators.
33 According to EPA's Envirofacts database, Both the empirical results and the SEPTER model also demonstrate that facilities that are currently targeted by regulators are much more likely to self-police than facilities that are not targeted. One reason for this is that the cost of self-policing for facilities with a relatively low probability of inspection is high compared to the expected cost of detection. Additionally, nontarget facilities might be concerned that a disclosure would draw the regulators' attention and might increase the likelihood of future enforcement. The fact that non-target facilities are unlikely to self-disclose can explain, at least in part, the current low level of participation with EPA's Audit Policy. Of the more than 600,000 regulated hazardous waste facilities, regulations than facilities that have learned about the appropriate way to comply through their encounters with regulators. To increase the participation of these facilities in the Audit Policy, EPA might want to draw attention to the fact that disclosures will not result in increased future enforcement even for facilities with low ex ante probability of inspection and, to the contrary, usually results in a significant decrease in future enforcement. More generally, since non-target facilities are less likely to participate in self-policing, regulators that are developing or modifying self-policing policies might want to focus outreach efforts on such facilities or consider methods for increasing the incentives for these facilities.
Conclusion
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the effect of Audit Policy disclosures on future enforcement efforts. The most important finding is that facilities that self-disclose under EPA's Audit Policy are rewarded with a significantly lower probability of inspection in the near future. While there is some evidence that the reward for disclosure is smaller for facilities with relatively good compliance records, there is no evidence that disclosures increase future enforcement efforts for these facilities. This lends support to Pfaff and Sanchirico's (2004) concern that facilities could use the disclosure of minor violations under the Audit Policy as "red herrings" to discourage future inspections.
The analysis also provides insight into the factors that motivate self-policing. Facilities that have not been inspected over the past five years are less likely to disclose while facilities that are inspected frequently are more likely to disclose, in part because they have more to gain from decreasing future enforcement efforts. Large and small quantity generators are more likely to disclose, as are facilities that are regulated under more than one media program. However, hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities are less likely to disclose, perhaps because these facilities are less likely to discover inadvertent violations, that is, the types of violations for which the Audit Policy is most appropriate. Finally, facilities in states with environmental audit immunity or self-policing policies are more likely to disclose as such policies provide additional incentives for disclosure.
The results of the analysis generally support the theoretical model of self-policing in a targeted enforcement regime that is summarized in this paper. This model suggests that some facilities will increase their level of auditing and abatement without making disclosures, implying that one should not evaluate the effectiveness of a self-policing policy by looking at disclosures alone. Additionally, the model indicates that some facilities may strategically disclose violations in order to decrease future enforcement and then take advantage of the "enforcement holiday." Thus, regulators need to carefully weigh the benefits of increased selfpolicing against the potential that facilities may strategically disclose. Finally, both the empirical results and the theoretical model suggest that facilities that are not on regulators' target list are the least likely to self-police even though such facilities might benefit significantly from selfpolicing. Thus regulators may want to focus their outreach efforts on such facilities or consider methods for increasing the incentives for these facilities.
This paper provides the first evidence on the consequences of self-policing. However, there are a number of complementary analyses that would further expand our understanding of how the Audit Policy is being implemented and how it affects overall environmental performance. First, this analysis only considers hazardous waste enforcement. It would be interesting to see whether disclosures have similar effects on enforcement for other environmental media or in non-environmental self-policing programs. Second, this analysis only considers the effect of disclosures on the immediate future. A panel analysis would provide information on the persistence of the rewards to self-disclosure. Finally, a more focused analysis of a facility's decision to disclose that also models the likelihood that a facility has something to disclose would provide a much deeper understanding of the factors that motivate self-policing. 
